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Stuart Muntzing Skok

Case Notes:
GRANDPARENT VISITATION
(Visitation Standard is Custody Standard)

By: Stuart Muntzing Skok, Esq.
Koshko v. Haining, No. 35, Sept. Term 2006, 2007 Md. Lexis 10

Section of Family & Juvenile Law Newsletter, May 2007

On January 12, 2007, the Court of Appeals essentially eliminated the grandparent visitation rights that have existed for twenty (20) years in Maryland (thankfully, after my grandparent visitation trial on January 2, 2007). In 1984, the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute, Family Law Article, § 9-102, was enacted to afford grandparents “reasonable” visitation when it serves the grandchildren’s “best interests.” Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 662 A.2d 121 (1993), set forth six (6) factors to determine whether grandparent visitation is in the grandchildren’s best interests. The United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 Ct. 2054 (2000), subsequently established a rebuttable presumption that parental decisions regarding grandparent visitation are in the children’s best interest (e.g. before the Fairbanks factors can be considered).

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Koshko v. Haining, 168 Md. App. 556, 897 A.2d 866 (2006) (“Koshko I”), upheld the trial court’s grant of grandparent visitation and held that the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute is to be interpreted to contain the Troxel rebuttable presumption. Grandparents were regularly awarded reasonable visitation until the Court of Appeals reversed Koshko I and overturned the Fairbanks line of cases.

Koshko v. Haining, No. 35, Sept. Term 2006, 2007 Md. Lexis 10

ISSUES ON APPEAL:

  1. Is the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute facially unconstitutional for failing to include a presumption that parental decisions regarding their children are in the children’s best interests?
     

  2. Was the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute unconstitutionally applied to the Koshkos absence a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances?

HOLDINGS:

  1. NO. The Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute may be supplemented by judicial interpretation with an inferred presumption that parental decisions regarding their children are in the children’s best interests, under the canon of constitutional avoidance. Therefore, under Troxel’s interpretation of the due process safeguards that must accompany a grandparent visitation statute, the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute is construed to include the application of the parental presumption.
     

  2. YES. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was unconstitutionally applied to the Koshko’s fundamental right to parent. The Grandparent Visitation Statute imposed a “direct and substantial” interference with the Koshko’s decisions regarding visitation, which decisions are presumed to be in the children’s best interests. The Court held that although there may be a difference in the degree of intrusion, visitation, like custody, intrudes upon the fundamental right of parents to care for their children. Therefore, the requirement to establish parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances in third-party custody cases must apply in third-party visitation cases, despite the lesser degree of intrusion on parental rights. In order to remedy the lack of narrow tailoring for the intrusion on parental rights, the Court again applied the canon of constitutional avoidance by holding that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is construed to require a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances as a prerequisite to the application of a best interest analysis.

The Court of Appeals reversed Koshko I and overturned five (5) cases to the extent they are inconsistent with the holding: Fairbanks, supra, Maner v. Stephenson, 342 Md. 461, 677 A.2d 560 (1996), Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995), Herrick v. Wain, 154 Md. App. 222, 838 A.2d 1263 (2003), and Wolinski v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 693 A.2d 30 (1997). The case was remanded to the Baltimore County trial court for further proceedings to apply the unfitness/exceptional circumstances threshold requirement.

BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Maternal grandparents, John and Maureen Haining, sued for visitation with their three (3) grandchildren, Kaelyn, Haley, and Aiden, children of their daughter and son-in-law, Andrea and Glen Koshko. Kaelyn was raised with her mother in the grandparents’ home in New Jersey for the first three (3) years of her life. The grandparents were active participants in Kaelyn’s upbringing.

Andrea and Kaelyn moved out of the grandparents’ home in September of 1997, and Andrea married Glen Koshko in 1998. In 1999, the Koshkos moved to Baltimore County and had two (2) more children. Despite the distance between the parties, the grandparents maintained a very close relationship with the grandchildren, with monthly visits and regular communications. In October of 2003, the grandparents’ visitation suddenly ended after a bitter fight between the grandparents and Glen Koshko over Glen’s treatment of his terminally-ill mother. When the grandparents’ efforts to reconcile with the Koshkos and reestablish visitation with the grandchildren failed, in April of 2004, the grandparents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

The trial court awarded the grandparents visitation, finding it to be in the grandchildren’s best interests, establishing a schedule of four-hour visits every forty-five (45) days and quarterly overnight visits, plus counseling for the parties. The Koshkos lost their Motion for New Trial and appealed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s visitation award, finding that the Grandparent Visitation Statute was neither facially unconstitutional nor as applied to the Koshkos.

The Court of Special Appeals relied on the principle of constitutional avoidance and held that the Grandparent Visitation Statute implicitly contains the presumption that parents act in the best interest of this children, pursuant to Troxel, supra. The Court found that the grandparents had successfully rebutted the presumption in favor of the parents’ decision to terminate visitation, based on evidence about the strong bond between the children and their grandparents and evidence that the parents had ceased the grandparent relationship because of a family fight unrelated to the children’s best interests.

The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Koshkos’ argument that there must be a threshold finding of parental “unfitness” or “exceptional circumstances” in order to consider grandparent visitation – the standard applicable in third party custody cases under McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005).

The Koshkos petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted writ of certiorari to consider the parents’ substantive due process challenge to the Grandparent Visitation Statute.

Practice Considerations:

For those who are wondering “what happens to my cases now?” See Footnote 23:

In affected cases pending at the time this opinion is filed, where appropriate, courts may allow amendments to pleadings or the presentation of additional evidence in light of the holdings announced here. In cases filed after this opinion, the petitioners, in order to avert or overcome a motion to dismiss their petition, must allege a sufficient factual predicate in the petition so as to present a prima facie case of unfitness or exceptional circumstances, as well as invoking the best interest standard….[citations omitted]. At any evidentiary hearing on a petition, the petitioners must produce evidence to establish their prima facie case on the issue of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances as well as evidence sufficient to tip the scales of the best interests balancing test in their favor. We appreciate that there may be circumstances where evidence proffered for the satisfaction of a threshold element also may have relevance in the determination of the best interest standard. We do not intend to foster a “trial within a trial.” At the end of the day, petitioners, in order to be successful, must shoulder the burdens to adduce at least a prima facie case on both the unfitness/exceptional circumstances standard and the best interests standard.

Therefore, all cases resolved before this case are not affected by the new law. For new cases, if you represent parents, a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is your first line of defense. If you represent grandparents, consider seeking custody rather than visitation given that the same standard applies. And for those who disagree with the Court of Appeals, lobby your legislative representatives to amend the Maryland Grandparent Visitation Statute to eliminate the threshold requirement, while maintaining the Troxel presumption and Fairbanks factors.

Stuart Muntzing Skok is a principal in the Law Firm of Gimmel, Weiman, Ersek, Blomberg & Skok, P.A. located in Gaithersburg, Maryland, focusing her practice in the area of family law. If you have any questions related to this article, she can be reached at (301) 840-8565 or sskok@gweblaw.com.
 



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